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Abstract 
In this paper we extend the work done by Askar, 2013. (Askar, S.S., 2013. On complex dynamics of monopoly market, 
Economic Modelling, 31, 586-589). The equilibrium state of a bounded rational monopolist model is studied.  It is assumed that 
the entire demand has a general non-linear form and the cost function is quadratic. The equilibrium of the model is equal to the 
level of price that maximizes profits, as can be seen in the classical microeconomic theory. However, complex dynamics can 
arise and the stability of equilibrium state is discussed. The complex dynamics, bifurcations and chaos are displayed by 
computing numerically Lyapunov numbers and sensitive dependence on initial conditions. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, many researchers have demonstrated that economic agents may not be fully rational. Even if one 
tries to do more efforts to perform things correctly, it is important to utilize simple rules previously tested in the past 
(Kahneman et al,1986; Naimzada and Ricchiuti, 2008). Efforts have been made to model bounded rationality to 
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different economic areas: oligopoly games (Agiza, Elsadany, 2003, Bischi et al, 2007); financial markets (Hommes, 
2006); macroeconomic models such as multiplier-accelerator framework (Westerhoff,2006). In particular, difference 
equations have been employed extensively to represent these economic phenomenons (Elaydi, 2005; Sedaghat, 
2003).  
Oligopolistic market structures have a distinguishing feature that is the output, pricing and other decisions of one 
firm affect, and are affected by, the similar decision made by other firms in the market. Indeed, game theory is one 
of the important tools in the economists' analytical kit for analyzing the strategic behavior of this market (Gibbons, 
1992, Webb, 2007). Various empirical works have shown that difference equations have been extensively used to 
simulate the behaviour of monopolistic markets (Abraham et al., 1997; Elaydi, 2005; Sedaghat, 2003).  
The canonical approach of the monopoly theory is essentially static and the monopolist has full rationality: both 
perfect computational ability and large informational set in such a way that she can determine both quantity and 
price to maximize profits. However, in the real market producers do not know the entire demand function, though it 
is possible that they have a perfect knowledge of technology, represented by the cost function. Hence, it is more 
likely that firms employ some local estimate of the demand. This issue has been previously analyzed by Baumol and 
Quandt, 1964, Puu 1995, Naimzada and Ricchiuti, 2008, Askar, 2013.  Naimzada and Ricchiuti evaluate a discrete 
time dynamic model with a cubic demand function without an inflexion point and linear cost function. Askar 
extends the work done by Naimzada and Ricchiuti with a general demand function.  
 In this paper, the equilibrium state of a bounded rational monopolist model is studied. It is assumed a general 
demand and quadratic cost functions and in this way we extend the work done by Askar, 2013. We show that 
complex dynamics can arise and the stability of equilibrium state is discussed. The complex dynamics, bifurcations 
and chaos are displayed by computing numerically Lyapunov numbers and sensitive dependence on initial 
conditions. 
2. The model 
The inverse demand function has a general form, it is downward sloping and concave: 
 
 ,  n ,  n >1np a bq  (1) 
where p indicates commodity price, q indicates the quantity demanded, and a and b are positive constants. The 
downward sloping is guaranteed if:  
 
 1 0ndp nbq
dq
 (2) 
that is if b>0. 
The quantity produced, q, is positive and non-negative prices are achieved if  
 
 0 n aq
b
 (3) 
We suppose that the cost function is quadratic   
 
 2C(q)=cq  (4) 
Moreover, we assume the general principle of setting price above marginal cost, p - c > 0, for each non negative q; 
that is, a > c. The main aim of the firm is to maximize the following profit function: 
 
 2( ) ( )nq a bq q cq  (5) 
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This function is concave and given the following first order condition: 
 
 2 ( 1) 0nd a cq n bq
dq
 (6) 
The marginal profit is strictly decreasing with range in the interval( , ]a , therefore Eq. (6) has a unique solution 
q* in this interval and the profit has a maximum at q*. If Π (q*) > 0 a positive equilibrium production is guaranteed. 
To achieve increasing profits, it is assumed that locally the monopoly firm, using a gradient mechanism, looks at 
how the variation of quantity affects the variation of profits. A positive (negative) variation of profits will induce the 
monopolist to change the quantity in the same (opposite) direction from that of the previous period. No changes will 
occur if profits are constant. This mechanism can be represented as follows: 
 
 ( 1) ( ) ,  t=0,1,2,...
( )
d
q t q t k
dq t
 (7) 
where k>0 is the speed of adjustment to misalignments. Substituting Eq. (6) in (7), we obtain the following one-
dimensional nonlinear difference equation: 
 
 ( 1) ( ) [ 2 ( ) ( 1) ( )]nq t q t k a cq t n bq t  (8) 
3. Dynamical Analysis 
3.1. Equilibria and Stabilty 
If 
 ( ) [ 2 ( 1) ]nf q q k a cq n bq  (9) 
 
The fixed points of Eq. (8) are the solutions of the equation ( )f q q , and then the fixed point is the solution of 
Eq.(6) 
 *q q  (10) 
Since 
 
2
* * 1
2
( ) 1 [ ( 1) ( ) 2 ] 1n
df d
q k n n b q c k
dq q
 (11) 
 
The steady state is locally stable if: 
 
 *1 ( ) 1k q  (12) 
 
Or, equivalently, 
 
*
2
0
( )
k
q
 (13) 
It follows that: 
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Proposition.  The map Eq. (8) has a unique steady state which is exactly the quantity that maximizes profits. It is 
locally stable if  
*
2
0
( )
k
q
   
 
3.2. Numerical Simulations 
The previous result indicates that a limited reaction of the monopolist to changes in profits can stabilize the quantity 
produced. On the other hand turbulences in the market are generated by an overreaction. To shed some light on what 
really happens in the market we employ a numerical analysis. Fixing the other parameters of the model as follows: 
 
 4, 0.6, 0.5a b c  (14) 
Then,  
 * * 24 1, 0.1538
(1)
n q k  (15) 
and   
 * *n= 5 0.966,  0.119q k  (16) 
 
The dynamic map (8) satisfies the canonical conditions required for the flip bifurcation (Abraham et al., 1997) and 
there is a period doubling bifurcation if k = k*. When k < k* the fixed point is attracting, when k  > k* it is repelling. 
Therefore, there is a change in the nature of dynamics when k = k*, a unique asymptotically stable period two-cycle 
arises.  
We graphically show how the behavior of the map Eq. (8) changes for different values of the reaction 
coefficient, k. (Kulenovic, M., Merino, O., 2002). In Fig. 1, we show the map Eq. (8) when k = 0.1. From Eq. (13), 
the steady state is asymptotically stable. In Fig. 2, we show the particular set of parameters that determines a period 
two-cycle, actually, with k = 0.16. Further growth of k leads the attractor to follow a typical route of flip bifurcations 
in complex price dynamics: a sequence of flip bifurcations generate a sequence of attracting cycles in period 2n, 
which are followed by the creation of a chaotic attractor. In Fig. 3, a cycle of period four is shown. To clarify the 
dynamics depending on k, we have reported a bifurcation diagram in Fig. 4. It shows different values of quantity for 
different values of k, particularly between 0 and 0.3. It is easily illustrated that we move from stability through a 
sequence of a period doubling bifurcations to chaos. In figure 4 are represented also the Lyapunov numbers of the 
orbit of 0.01, for k = 0.24, versus the number of iterations of the map (8). If the Lyapunov number is greater of 1, 
one has evidence for chaos. To demonstrate the sensitivity to initial conditions of Eq.(6),  we compute two orbits 
(100 iterations of the map) with initial points q0 and q0+ 0.0001 respectively. The results are shown in Fig.5. At the 
beginning the time series are indistinguishable; but after a number of iterations, the difference between them builds 
up rapidly. In Fig. 6, we have reported a bifurcation diagram of the map Eq. (6) for n = 5 and the Lyapunov numbers 
of the orbit of 0.01, for n = 5 and k = 0.18. In Fig. 7, we show the sensitivity to initial conditions of Eq.(6), for n = 5, 
k = 0.18. 
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Fig.1. Convergence for for a =4,b=0.6, c= 0.5, n = 4  and k=0.1 
 
 
 
                       
 
 
Fig. 2. Cycle of period 2, for a =4,b=0.6, c= 0.5 and k= 0.16 
 
 
                         
 
 
Fig. 3. Cycle of period 4, for a =4,b=0.6, c= 0.5 and k= 0.2 
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Fig.4. For n=4, bifurcation diagram with respect to the parameter k against variable q, for q0=0.01 and 550 iterations of the map (8) (left) and 
Lyapunov numbers of the orbit of 0.01, for k =0.24, versus the number of iterations of the map (8) (right).  
 
 
     
 
Fig.5. For n = 4, sensitive dependence on initials conditions: q plotted against the time, parameter value k=0.24 and initial condition q0 = 0.01 
(left), q0 = 0.0101 (right). 
 
     
 
Fig.6 For n = 5, bifurcation diagram with respect to the parameter k  against variable q, with  q0=0.01 and 550 iterations of the map (8) (left) and 
Lyapunov numbers of the orbit of 0.01, for k =0.18, versus the number of iterations of the map (8) (right).  
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Fig.7. For n = 5, sensitive dependence on initials conditions: q plotted against the time, parameter value k=0.18  and initial condition q0 = 0.01 
(left), q0 = 0.0101 (right). 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have analyzed the effects on the equilibrium of a monopoly when the monopolist has bounded 
rationality. Particularly, the monopolist, not knowing the entire demand function, employs a rule of thumb to 
produce the quantity that guarantees the largest profits. The steady state of the map is exactly the level of production 
that maximizes profits, as can be seen in the classic microeconomic theory. However, complex dynamics can arise.  
For some values a parameter there is a locally stable equilibrium which is the value that maximizes the profit 
function. Increasing these values, the equilibrium becomes unstable, through period-doubling bifurcation. The 
complex dynamics, bifurcations and chaos are displayed by computing numerically Lyapunov numbers and 
sensitive dependence on initial conditions. We achieve these results employing a discrete time dynamical model 
such as that used by Askar 20013; however, we use a quadratic cost function.  
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